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Abstract
Only since the early 90s, when unemployment rates in Switzerland soared to unprecedented
levels, federal technology and innovation policy has begun to design their activities also with
regard to employment and the establishment of new firms. Now, all across the country, private
as well as public incubator facilities, technology and innovation centers began to pop up like
mushrooms in autumn. This papers starts with describing the theoretical and methodological
background of that survey. In a first step, all cantonal offices for economic promotion are
asked to report and to describe incubator facilities, technology and innovation centers within
their realm. In a second step a selection of centers were analyzed in-depth. The results circle
around the questions: who takes the initiative to establish a center? What are the motives for
establishing such centers? What kind of services do centers offer? What branches are the start-
up firms in and what level of technology do they utilize? How long are start-ups allowed to
stay in the centers? How far away do these centers with their services attract start-ups?
Together with selected foreign experiences, some recommendations for the operation of such
centers are formulated. The paper closes with some conclusions for federal and regional
innovation and employment policy.
Key words: incubator, technology and innovation center, federal and regional innovation and
technology policy, structural change.2
1  Background
Incubator facilities, technology or innovation centers are quite new business for Switzerland.
Public awareness about their existence and their functions in general is very low. In the realm
of public policy there are two strands of discussion which are shaping the Swiss reality. The
German boom of technology, innovation and incubator centers that started in the 1980s and
then spread to Austria (Sternberg et al. 1996; Galley 1997; Tödtling, Tödtling-Schönhofer
1990). On the other hand it is the glitter-like discourse about the hopes for copying the Silicon
Valley Fever (Rogers, Larsen 1984) and the respective science parks boom in the U.S.A. and
the UK alike (European Commission 1996; Westhead, Batstone 1999).
Incubator facilities, technology and innovation centers - ITI for short - carry much hope and
are mostly put in place to follow a multitude of aims. In general management and sponsors of
these centers claim to have at least one or more of the following objectives:
• To promote or increase regional development;
• To increase the rate of start-up companies with above average innovation potential;
• To help to contribute to structural change of local or regional economy;
• To contribute to general labor market goals by creating new jobs.
These major goals appear across most of the debate about ITI. Still, in Switzerland, there is
very little awareness and very little knowledge on impacts of these centers, on their clientele
and institutional aspects of successful management and the like. It is only since the early 1990s,
that the unemployment rate in Switzerland soared to unprecedented levels. That fact in many
regards began to change Swiss perception on economic development. Only then, federal
technology and innovation policy has started to consider their activities also with regard to
employment and the establishment of new firms.
Meanwhile, all across the country, private as well as public ITI began to develop and to offer
advice and support for company start-ups. In spite of all these ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, Swiss
federal policy up to now did not have a consistent and in-depth account on the various local
and regional activities.3
2  The design of the survey on incubator facilities in Switzerland
Since the creation of new firms is by nature a very disperse and local activity, information has
to be gathered where it happens. In the Swiss case, that meant a two-step survey, thus trying
to draw the full picture of incubator facilities in Switzerland by bringing together bits and
pieces of scattered knowledge.
In the first round in early 1998, all of the 26 cantonal offices for economic promotion were
asked by a postal survey to name and to describe incubator, technology or innovation centers
which are located within their cantonal boundary. This approach produced a total of 40
facilities all across Switzerland, but with a tendency to agglomerate in the Swiss Plateau, that is
the densely populated economic area stretching from east to west. One year later, a follow-up
survey showed the high volatility of this ‘incubator business’, because we then counted already
61 centers. This indicates that already the 1998 survey did not fully cover all the then existing
ITI: certain centers have not been included in the survey, others have already closed their
doors in the meantime.
The second round of the study chose nine ITI for an in-depth postal survey which was
followed by a moderated workshop. This time it was the managers of the centers who
themselves provided the answers to our questionnaire. These nine centers were selected with
respect to their geographical location – German, French and Italian speaking part of
Switzerland – and with respect to their focus on start-up activities and services.
It has to be mentioned at this time that there is no uniform definition of these notions. It almost
seems that labels are used at random or to deliberately create an image of modernism or high-
tech although quite many of these centers are not much more than common business parks.
The range of notions go from ‘science parks’, ‘research parks’, ‘technology centers’,
‘innovation centers’ and ‘incubator centers’ to ‘start-up initiatives’ or ‘business parks’ (Luger,
Goldstein 1989; Sternberg 1988). A basic feature to distinguish these centers is to look for
infrastructure. Incubator and technology centers usually offer office space and additional
infrastructure geared to their specific clientele. The next chapter will focus on these questions
and other features of ITI.4
3  The results of the survey
3.1  Who takes the initiative?
In Switzerland, 43 percent of all ITI were established by a joint public-private effort. Table 1
shows, that ITI most commonly are a combination of public business promoters and private
companies or other private institutions like foundations or business associations.
Table 1: Who takes the initiative to establish a ITI?
Initiators Number
• • Start-up companies themselves
• • Economic promotion of cantons
• Other public institutions
Including other departments of public administration in cantons, cities or other public agencies,
public institutions of higher education and public testing labs
• Other private companies
Including foundations or business associations







Source: Thierstein et al. 1999
3.2  What do ITI offer?
Table 2 shows that in Switzerland more than half of all ITI offer space to rent; 18 ITI provide
rates below market level. In addition to subsidized rents, 21 ITI make available also joint
amenities like meeting rooms, secretariat, fax machine, copier, etc. Centers with this kind of
services typically are called ‘incubator and technology centers’ (Sternberg 1988). In contrast,
43 percent of Swiss ITI do not make available any rental space nor technical infrastructure.
They are labelled ‘start-up support initiatives’.











With training and education
programmes




23 18 21 5 5
In percent 57,7 45.0 52,5 12,5 12,5
ITI without rental
space
17 - - 5 1
In percent 42,5 - - 12,5 2,55
n = 40 ; partially multiple answers
Source: Thierstein et al. 1999
Joint amenities are supplied in 21 cases, but training and educational programmes are mostly
lacking. 60 percent of all ITI do not have own facilities and only pass on relevant information
about out-house services to start-up firms.
Offering specific services to their target groups makes an ITI improve its market profile:
around 90 percent of all Swiss ITI offer consulting services or recommend consultants by third
persons. 34 ITI support start-up firms in their early stage; 18 centers in addition make services
available that go beyond the start-up phase (table 3).
Table 3: services for target groups of ITI
Services of ITI In-house service






















Support of start-up phase 34
1 85,0 - 6
Support beyond start-up phase 18 45,0 - 22
Rental space









Joint amenities 21 52,5 - 19
Training and education 10 25,0 6 24
n = 40; multiple answers
1 = three ITI included which only offer ‚support beyond start-up phase‘
Source: Thierstein et al. 1999
3.3  Motives for establishing ITI
The main motive for the creation of ITI is to promote start-ups and the innovative potential
(80 percent; chart 1); the latter motive almost always means strengthening the regional
innovative potential. In most cases, the local environment seems to have too little innovative
potential for a ITI to concentrate on. More than 60 percent of the ITI focus on the labor
market argument, that is to create new and qualified jobs. Exploitation of real estate and the
reutilization of manufacturing plants obviously play a minor role.6
Chart 1:  Motives for establishing ITI
Source: Thierstein et al. 1999
3.4 Branch and technological orientation of ITI
Our survey shows that the target branches of Swiss ITI are predominantly manufacturing,
services, and development activities (chart 2). Research and marketing activities are of much
lower importance. The start-up companies in the ITI therefore concentrate on more applied
and service oriented activities.
Chart 2: Dominant activity of firms in ITI
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percent n = 39; multiple answers7
What level of technological competence do start-up firms display? The basic assumption
behind this question goes as follows: regional economic development is mainly spurred by new
technology based firms (NTBF) in the manufacturing sector (Malecki 1983; Autio, Yli-Renko
1998). In addition to NTBF it is also innovation based firms as well as production and business
service based firms, that today complement regional development dynamics (Illeris, Philippe
1993).
In the Swiss case, more than half of all ITI (25 cases) concede that their firms’ activities have a
considerable or very considerable input of technology. This fact means in terms of profile for
ITI, that these centers which want to cater for (high) technology start-ups have to locate
themselves in or close to agglomerations. Else, the ‘market’ for their preferred target group
might be too narrow and operating of an ITI may not be profitable. This very fact has led some
ITI to letting in start-up firms which do not fit the ITI’s original profile or target group.
3.5 Are start-ups limited in their stay in ITI?
To limit the time span that start-ups are allowed to stay within a center and to use their
facilities can be seen as an indication that the ITI follows at least partially regional development
objectives. Setting a time limit usually makes firms fluctuate more frequently and that in turn
gives more entrepreneurs the opportunity to make use of these ITI.
Table 4:  length of stay in ITI
Length of time to stay
in center
Numbers of ITI Stay is limited:

















n = 31 ; three cases with multiple answers
1: One answer without clear declaration on time limits; in certain cases an average time span is used
Source: Thierstein et al. 1999
Table 4 shows that more than half of all ITI do not limit the length of stay for their
‘customers’
2. Three centers in addition keep the option to nevertheless limit the stay of firms.
Thus it can be concluded that these centers are not primarily aiming at promoting the most
possible numbers of start-ups; they instead focus on employing their facilities to capacity.8
Beside the large number of ITI without time limits it is this very time limit itself that is
interesting: three centers only give a very temporary support (one year) while the other eleven
ITI orient themselves more along the 'natural' life cycle of start-ups. These centers either limit
the length of stay to a more ‘incentive like’ basis of three to four years, while others give a
more generous margin of five to six years.
Over all, the survey gives the impression that the ITI are not very much preoccupied considering
the time span start-ups are invited to stay within a center. One indication is the rather large
number of missings to that very aspect in the questionnaire (nine centers). Beside problems of
comprehension, one reason for the ITI might be their own young age as an institution and
therefore their not running at full capacity; hence they do not care much about such aspects yet.
3.6  How far is the spatial orientation of ITI's activities?
The centers were asked how far in geographical or spatial terms do their activities reach or
what the spatial realm of their ‘customers’ is, i.e. where do start-ups come from to establish
themselves in the center. Four options were given in the questionnaire: ‘local’, ‘regional’,
‘interregional/national’ or ‘international’.
Most of the start-ups in ITI originate within the region of that specific center (chart 3). Never-
theless around 40 percent of all start-ups come quite a long way, that is national or interna-
tional or have their business relations on these levels. The local level obviously is of very minor
importance. As already mentioned it seems that for almost all ITI the local context has a too











Chart 3 : Spatial orientation of ITI
Source:  Thierstein et al. 1999
4  Conclusions and recommendations for the design of ITI
4.1  General remarks
The following chapter concentrates on general recommendations for designing successful
operating incubator centers in Switzerland. The first boom phase of incubator und technology
centers in Germany and Austria did not affect Switzerland much. This is not only due to the
then very low unemployment rate in this country but even more to the almost complete
absence of an explicit technology and innovation policy in Switzerland. The necessary political
awareness for deploying such a new-style instrument to promote economic development in the
large sense was missing.
Today it seems that foreign experiences help a great deal to avoid wrong ways and dead end
streets. In this regard slow adaptation of ‘hip’ international concepts seem to be more of an
advantage than stubborn reticence to modernism. It gives time to carefully evaluate and then
draw productive conclusions. Especially the German experience shows that the initial euphoria
and expectations that were attached to that instrument did not materialize. Scaling down of
expectations brought a shift in focus from the original supply-side approach to a demand-side
approach of ITI. The factual demand within a region sets the capacity and determines the
services of ITI. This approach prevents from high-flying ‘across-the-board’ services being
supplied in the centers.
One very important fact for Switzerland is the comparatively high percentage of private
owners or initiators of ITI which want to be profitable on a full cost basis. As reverse side of
that coin these dynamic private initatives led to a certain lack of transparency about these ITI.
In general there is little consolidated knowledge about strategies, services and such
3.
Considering the comparatively large share of private centers, the instument of ITI has not been
utilized much for purposes of regional economic development.
The main reasons for a certain intransparency with respect to ITI are as follows. First there is
no vertical coordination between the three levels of political organisation in Switzerland, that is
the federal, the cantonal and the municipal level. Second there also is very little horizontal
coordination between the ITI themselves. Certainly, there is a so called ‘Club of technology10
centers’ in Switzerland which exchanges experiences on a regular basis. But a lot of ITI with
lower technology orientation give themselves a very ambitious mission statement that prevents
sometimes from cooperating more closely. On the other side it is often public bodies which
operate with exaggerated expectations towards the delivering capacity of such ITI.
To sum up, ITI find themselves confronted with a threefold field of tension:
• to fulfill certain public tasks or needs;
• to follow their own objectives, mostly on a market cost basis and
• to live up to their quite often over ambitious self-image and overestimated performance.
4.2  Incubator centers follow a multitude of objectives
Looking at foreign experiences one detects two distinct general patterns or models for
incubator, technology and innovation centers:
• the ‘continental European model’  is predominantly publicly funded and focusses on public
policy objectives like improving regional economic development and fostering innovative
networks.
• The ‘anglo-saxon model’  is geared more towards the creation of new technology and
science based firms which in turn necessitates close cooperation with and proximity to
universities and higher educational and research institutions.
Within that typology, Switzerland has a special position. Although there are much more ITI
along the continental European model, private initiators are much more frequent than public
funding. Swiss ITI therefore are more geared toward profitability. Thus Swiss ITI are quite
distinct from ‘first generation centers’ in Germany or Austria.
The ITI centers in Switzerland usually follow a multitude of objectives, quite often focussed on
goals of regional development in a large sense. One main reason is the predominant share of
privately operated ITI which have a quite different economic logic then public funded
institutions. They are interested in employing the center at full capacity and are therefore
focussed on profitability. By doing so, they are not so much interested in a constant flow of
incoming and outgoing firms in such a way that the benefits of ITI go to the largest clientele
possible. Looking at ITI from a regional development angle, these centers are torn between
being profitable and running at full capacity on the one hand or serving as many start-ups as
possible in the other.11
Nevertheless privately run ITI with no limited time to stay also have positive effects on
regional development. They offer very specific quality services which in turn adds up to a
favorable climate for start-ups in general and may thus foster a regional ‘start-up culture’.
4.3  Incubator centers: the labor market argument
Evidence shows that ITI in general do not have a significant impact on reducing unemployment
on the macro economic level. Foreign evaluations point to the fact that qualitative effects
outrun quantitative effects by large (Behrendt 1996; Sternberg 1995). There are accounts on
how many jobs have been created by ITI centers. Usually these numbers include jobs that
would have been created anyway or outside the centers (crowding-out effect) by start-up
companies. In the best case, ITI improve the local economic structure and local image.
The more ITI are focussed on technology and research activities the more these centers are
located in larger cities, urban agglomerations and are drawing in turn from know-how from
universities and higher technical institutions. Therefore, ‘high-tech ITI’ will not contribute to
the improvement of peripheral or economically depressed regions with unfavorable
employment structures. Instrumentalization of ITI for regional development in unfavorable
economic environments only will make sense when the centers target their activity towards
non-high-tech and ‘everyday economic activities’ start-ups which have to be integrated in a
well functioning regional network.
4.4  Incubator centers: their role for structural change
ITI centers are able to contribute to the regional restructuration of economic activities. They
may play on the one hand a significant role in establishing innovation networks between
existing firms and innovation and technology based start-up companies. On the other hand they
are important intermediary actors with regional universities and higher educational and
research institutions. It is assumed that such a regional network integration succeeds the more
the ITI centers are able to base their activities on the already existing economic potential of
that very region. Therefore it is crucial, that ITI can draw financially and institutionally on a
multitude of regional actors.
Public support, as one important conclusion, should nevertheless concentrate on initiating and
moderating the process for the establishment of ITI centers. Most of the times, public12
authorities are not able to pick successfully future economic activities or technologies. But
what seems important is to try to diffuse the benefits of ITI on to a broad network of actors
and to involve them in these networks.
4.5  Concluding remarks
All participants in the present study apprehended with enormous surprise the extent of ITI
already in place and operating in Switzerland. First the survey only wanted to focus on
incubator centers which support solely start-up companies. In the early stage of this research it
became very clear, that there is no clear-cut distinction between incubators, technology, and
innovation centers, and related private and public initiatives to foster and support the creation
of new firms in this country.
Almost unnoticed by the broader public and by politics, Switzerland developed a growing
number of ITI centers within the last five to six years. It is up to now a more or less bottom-
up, self-organizing process, fuelled by private initiative and some proactive public authorities,
that leads to the above described multitude of centers and initiatives in Switzerland. By doing
so, the ITI centers establish, as a by-product, a new instrument for regional economic
development, noteworthy without deliberate public intention.
Our evaluation showed a couple of positive impacts of ITI centers. Nevertheless, it has to be
added, that this dynamic development is not without problems. Lack of horizontal
coordination between the various ITI centers and the still very underdeveloped public
discourse might lead to a picture of ITI that varies very much in terms of quality and reliability.
Flaws in operating concepts and a small scale spatial competition between single communities
may lead to a misallocation of resources. On top there is still another aspect: even when ITI
operate on a strictly private finance basis – and therefore any risk of failure is covered by
private capital – there is a need for a minimum of coordination with regional or local public
bodies. In the Swiss context it is a sure fact, that proactive cooperation between various ITI
and public institutions increases the positive impacts of these centers on their economic and
social environment.
In order to operate ITI centers more effectively we present the following recommendations
which address at the same time public bodies as well as private initiators:13
• Public authorities should consider to mandate ITI with certain tasks and delivering
services in the context of promotion of start-up firms and regional development. The
contracting out of public tasks or duties is well in line with new public management
acitivities which now go about in many countries and many public administrations all
around the globe.
• Incubator, technology and innovation centers not only get the opportunity to take on some
public functions but also some formerly private activities. For example regional or local
chambers of commerce more and more are challenged by their member firms to deliver
effective and up-to-date services. It is this dynamics that qualify ITI to take on start-up
related tasks from private business associations or vocational institutions.
In Switzerland the new federal law on higher educational institutions (HEI; Fachhochschulen)
necessitates these HEI to develop their own research and development acitivities and to enter
the 'business' of diffusion and dissemination of such results. In order to fulfill this task it might
be helpful to team up with a ITI and to develop a regional or even interregional network or
center of competence. This may help to contribute to the improvement of regional innovative
capabilities which are more connected to certain features of innovative milieus and
complementary networks than to a strict geographical boundary of a region (Koschatzky
1998).
Our survey on features and various activities of ITI finally showed one thing very clearly: start-
ups of new firms are not restricted to high-technology activities only. On the contrary, it is the
diversity of new firms with economic activities along the whole chain of value-added that
finally contributes to the restructuring of a regional or local economic tissue. Therefore it
becomes quite obvious that public support has its legitimation where private capital does not
dare to invest. Obviously seed money is one of these fields of market failure, because private
venture capital all too often concentrates only on glamorous high-tech start-ups with
expectations for rapid firm growth and consequently high return on investment. The Swiss
experience demonstrates that there are ITI which can be run effectively and still follow public
interest, that is balanced regional development and a minimum of diversity in economic
activities. Thus, ITI can be a meaningful economic instrument, but still underrated in
Switzerland.14
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